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RAILROADS - REORGANIZATION - VALIDITY OF CONDITIONING APPROVAL OF A CONSOLIDATION BY REFERENCE TO PROPER TREATMENT OF
EMPLOYEES - A railroad made application to the Interstate Commerce Commission to obtain authorization to lease the lines of another railroad. The
relevant federal statute provided that the commission should authorize consolidations and leases subject to such terms and conditions as it should find just and
reasonable and as would promote the public interest.1 Accordingly, the commission conditioned approval of the lease by requiring that employees dismissed as a
result of the lease be paid monthly allowances for fixed periods, or until securing
re-employment; that those not dismissed be protected against any decrease in
wages for five years, and reimbursed for expenses of moving necessitated by the
lease. Evidence was introduced to show that the cost of the employee protection
plan would amount to about one-half of the savings to be obtained by the railroad during the period of labor adjustment. Held, that under the existing statute
authorizing the commission to impose conditions that will promote the "public
interest," the commission had authority to impose conditions regarding the
interest of affected employees. Also this construction of the statute was ruled
constitutional as within the scope of congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce, and as not a denial of due process. United States v. Lowden, 308
U.S. 225, 60 S. Ct. 248 (1939).
The most serious contention against the exercise of this authority by the
commission would appear to be that employee-protection powers are not expressly given to the commission, and that such conditions as imposed in the
instant case can have no relationship to maintenance of an adequate transportation system and in consequence cannot be said to promote the "public interest"
in the statutory sense. While not explicit, it is true that the wording of the

1 lnterstate Commerce Act, as amended, 48 Stat. L. 217 (1933), 49 U. S. C.
(193_4), § 5 (4) (b). This section provides that the commission on application by the
carrier or carriers concerned may, after hearing, authorize such consolidation or lease,
and directs that "If after such hearing the Commission finds that, subject to such terms
and conditions ••• as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed consolidation
• • • [or] lease ••• will be in harmony with and in furtherance of the plan for the
consolidation of railway properties established pursuant to paragraph (3), and will promote the public interest, it may enter an order approving •.. such consolidation ••• [or]
lease • • • upon the terms and conditions and with the modifications so found to be
just and reasonable." The Transportation Act of 1940 passed subsequent to this case,
and referred to in note I 2, infra, superseded this act.
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Interstate Commerce Act, section 5 ( 4) (b) 2 is sufficiently broad to authorize
the Court's construction, although the conditions imposed by the commission
under an almost identical earlier section had never related to matters of employment. 3 Still, the question of labor displacement by railroad consolidation cannot
be regarded as a new problem,-the need for making some provision for employees adversely affected by consolidation has long been recognized by labor
organizations as well as carrier executives. 4 Congress may well have had this
possibility in mind when conferring upon the Interstate Commerce Commission
the broad power to impose conditions that may appear just and reasonable and in
the "public interest," for consolidation and its concomitant labor displacement
problems had been brought to its attention before this enactment,5 Congress had
passed several measures for arbitration of labor disputes between railroad employees and employers, all aimed at the prevention of interruption of railroad
service through such disputes, and culminating in the Railway Labor Act of
1926.6 Also the Safety Appliance Act,7 the Hours of Service Act,8 and the
Federal Employees Liability Act 9 were designed to insure the safety and welfare of railroad employees. The constitutionality of these measures has been
sustained on the ground that they fostered the commerce in which the employees
were engaged. Again, it would appear that the chief benefits of an extensive
program of consolidation are not to be at the expense of labor, as has been
clearly indicated by Congress in the "labor freezing" and other employee protection provisions of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933.10 In
2

Id.
See note in 52 HARV. L. REv, 694 at 695 (1939). This article was written
before the decision handed down in the principal case, and suggests doubt as to the
commission's authority.
4
Doak, "Consolidation from the Railroad Employees' Viewpoint," 13 PRoc. AcAD,
Pot, Sci., No. 3, p. 80 (1929); Willard, "The Status of Railroad Consolidation," id.,
· 119 at 122. On May 21, 1936, in Washington, D. C., representatives of 219 railroads
and 21 labor organizations reached an agreement providing for payment of dismissal
compensation, expenses of transfer, and protection against loss in sale of home. 57
TRAFFIC WoRLD 995 (1936).
5
_ _ The Railroad Labor Board in 1929 arbitrated the dispute of the Texas and
Pacific Railroad Company with its employees, arising out of consolidation of plant
facilities. The board awarded the employees compensation for depreciation in the value
of their homes. The board found that such a requirement was reasonable in view of the
fact that railroads themselves had on several prior occasions compensated the employees
affected. 28 MoNTHLY LAB, REv. No. 3, p. 49 (1929). See also, 43 MoNTHLY LAB,
REv. 867 (1936), where dismissal compensation was agreed upon in similar circumstances under threat of strike.
6
44 Stat. L. 577 (1926), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 151 et seq. See Texas & New
Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S. Ct.
427 (1930).
7
- 27 Stat. L. 531 (1893), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § I et seq. See Southern R.R.
v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2 (1911).
8
34 Stat. L. 1415 (1907), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 61 et seq. See Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612, 31 S. Ct. 621 (1911).
9
35 Stat. L. 65 (1909), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 51 et seq.
10
48 Stat. L. 214 (1933), 49 U.S. C. (1934), § 257(b). See discussion of this
3
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the light of the foregoing record of congressional recognition of railroad labor
problems as a matter of public concern, it would seem clear that Congress, by
its choice of the broad language in section 5 (4~ (b ),11 intended that labor
problems arising from consolidations and leases should be considered a matter
of "public interest" when, as here, these conditions are closely related to the
public policy of the Transportation Act to facilitate railroad consolidation and
thereby promote the adequacy and efficiency of the railroad transportation
system. However, whatever doubts as to the interpretation of the statute that
have existed heretofore are now put at rest, for very recently and subsequent
to the principal case, Congress has enacted the Transportation Act of 1940 12 in
which provision is expressly made for labor protection. A question remains as
to whether the former statute as construed in the principal case and the present
act with its express wording come within the bounds of congressional power
to regulate interstate commerce. It is true that in Railroad Retirement Board v.
Alton R. R.,1 3 the Railroad Retirement Act 14 was declared not to be a valid
regulation of interestate commerce, on the ground that a compulsory retirement
system for railroad employees can have no relation to the promotion of efficiency,
economy, or safety of railroad operation. Yet it would appear that the Alton
case can be distinguished by a showing that the particular measure is reasonably
calculated to improve interstate commerce,15 as here, or it may be suggested that
the Supreme Court has of late been more willing to accept the legislature's
definition as to what factors affect interstate commerce in lieu of its own judgment thereon.16 In answer to due process clause objections, it has been held that
point in 39 CoL. L. REv. 514 (1939), in connection with this case. The Interstate
Commerce Commission has estimated that consolidation of the country's railroads into a
limited number of large systems would result in savings, 75% of which would be at
the expense of labor. Consolidation of Railroads, 159 I. C. C. 522 (1929), 185 I. C. C.

403 (1932).
11

See note 1, supra.
Transportation Act of 1940, Pub. Act No. 785, approved Sept. 16, 1940,
reported in 9 U. S. LAW WEEK no. 13 (Sept. 24, 1940). Title I, § 7(£) provides "As
a condition of its approval ••• of any transaction involving a carrier or carriers by a
railroad subject to the provisions of this part, the Commission shall require a fair and
equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected. In its
order of approval, the Commission shall include terms and conditions providing that
during the period of four years from the effective date of such order such transaction
will not result in employees of the carrier or carriers by railroad affected by such order
being in a worse position in respect to their employment, except that the protection
afforded to any employee ••. shall not be required 'to continue for a longer period,
following the date of such order, than the period during which such employee was
in the employ of such carrier or carriers prior to the effective date of such order."
13
295 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758 (1935).
14
48 Stat. L. 1283 (1934), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 201 et seq.
15
See Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 5 l 5, 57 S. Ct.
592 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
u. s.161, 57 s. Ct. 615 (1937).
National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 at 604, 59 S. Ct.
668 (1939); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
12
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a business may be required to carry the burden of employee wastage, incident to
its operation, without a denial of due process; 17 moreover, the due process objections fatal to the railroad retirement plan in the d lton case, which seems analogous to a plan of dismissal compensation, have apparently been repudiated by the
Supreme Court.18 Thus, by virtue of the decision herein principally discussed,
the principles embodied in th.e labor protection provisions of the Transportation
Act of I 940 are grounded in a history of successful litigation and should enjoy
immunity from constitutional attack.
Kenneth J. Nordstrom

17 In Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 S. Ct. 169
(1924), it was held that th~ Fifth Amendment does not forbid the compulsory
application of incomes as the result of commission action to specified purposes in the
furtherance of the public interest in railway transportation. See also, Second Employer's
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. I at SI, 32 S. Ct. 169 (1912).
18 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868 (1937).

